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We consider a generic problem in which a firm sells products over T periods without knowing the demand
function. The firm sequentially sets prices to earn revenue and to learn the underlying demand function
simultaneously. A natural heuristic for this problem, commonly used in practice, is greedy iterative least
squares (GILS). At each time period, GILS estimates the demand as a linear function of the price by applying
least squares to the set of prior prices and realized demands. Then a price that maximizes the revenue,
given the estimated demand function, is used for the next time period. The performance is measured by
the regret, which is the expected revenue loss from the optimal (oracle) pricing policy when the demand
function is known. Recently, den Boer and Zwart (2014) and Keskin and Zeevi (2014) demonstrated that
GILS is sub-optimal. They introduced algorithms which integrate forced price dispersion with GILS and
achieve asymptotically optimal performance.
In this paper, we consider this dynamic pricing problem in a data-rich environment. In particular, we
assume that the firm knows the expected demand under a particular price from historical data, and in each
period, before setting the price, the firm has access to extra information (demand covariates) which may be
predictive of the demand. Demand covariates can include marketing expenditures, geographical information,
consumers socio-economic attributes, macroeconomic indices, weather, etc. We prove that in this setting the
behavior of GILS is dramatically different and it achieves asymptotically optimal regret of order log(T ). We
also show the following surprising result: in the original dynamic pricing problem of den Boer and Zwart
(2014), Keskin and Zeevi (2014), inclusion of any set of covariates in GILS as potential demand covariates
(even though they could carry no information) would make GILS asymptotically optimal. We validate our
results via extensive numerical simulations on synthetic and real data sets.
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1. Introduction
Companies launch new products periodically without accurate prior knowledge of the true demand.
One method to learn the demand function is price experimentation, where companies adaptively
modify prices to learn the hidden demand function and use that to estimate the revenue-maximizing
price. Nevertheless, proper price experimentation is a challenging problem due to the potential
revenue loss during the learning horizon that can be substantially large. In fact optimally balancing
the trade-off between randomly selecting prices to expedite the learning versus selecting prices
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2that maximize the expected earning has been subject of recent research in the operations manage-
ment literature. Learning and earning are also known by exploration and exploitation respectively.
In particular, den Boer and Zwart (2014), Keskin and Zeevi (2014) studied greedy iterated least
squared (GILS), a popular heuristic used in practice, which works by greedily selecting the best
price based on the most up-to-date estimation of the demand at any time. GILS pricing policy is
also known by myopic pricing or certainty equivalent pricing. den Boer and Zwart (2014), Keskin
and Zeevi (2014) showed that GILS is sub-optimal and suffers from incomplete learning. In addi-
tion, they introduced algorithms that integrate forced price dispersion with GILS and achieve
asymptotically optimal regret. Despite these results, in most applications, greedy policies such as
GILS are popular due to their simplicity and due to the common perception of the firms that price
experimentation could lead to substantial revenue loss.
On the other hand, thanks to growing availability of data and advances in statistical learning,
estimation problems such as the aforementioned demand learning can be solved much more accu-
rately in data-rich environments. The most common approach in boosting the accuracy is through
introduction of covariates (or predictors or features) and finding a function that accurately maps
the covariates and price to the outcome of interest (demand in our case). Examples of covariates
for the demand estimation could be market size, macroeconomic indices, seasonality, or geographic
indicators.
In this paper we study the impact of including demand covariates on the aforementioned trade-
off between learning and earning. While adding these covariates is a natural step to improve the
demand estimation and hence to expedite the learning, we show an additional and surprising ben-
efit; inclusion of the demand covariates in the popular GILS approach automatically solves the
incomplete-learning problem. In other words, no pro-active learning is required and the companies
can focus all of their attention to earning. We provide general sufficient conditions for asymptoti-
cally optimality of GILS with demand covariates. A technical part of our analysis is proving sharp
concentration inequalities for the minimum singular value of the least squared design matrix and
relies on a recent concentration inequality for sum of matrix martingales by Tropp (2011).
In addition, we prove that even if the demand covariates are irrelevant and do not improve the
demand estimation, their inclusion is beneficial and makes GILS asymptotically optimal. In other
words, the process of learning which covariates have coefficients equal to zero (feature selection)
which is usually performed separately by data scientists, if combined with GILS pricing policy,
dramatically improves the performance. The added uncertainty from not knowing which variables
are predictive, creates automatic price experimentation that solves the incomplete learning problem
of GILS.
Finally, via extensive numerical simulations on synthetic and real data sets, we demonstrate
robustness of our results to the assumptions required by the theory.
31.1. Organization of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related research and it is
followed by formal definition of the problem and GILS policy in Section 3. Analysis of the regret
and our main theoretical results are presented in Section 4 while empirical simulations are given in
Section 5. Section 6 covers final remarks and discussions, and all proofs are provided in Appendix
A. In Appendix B we explain how the proofs can be extended when our modeling assumptions on
covariates and demand uncertainty are generalized.
2. Related Literature
The trade-off between learning and earning has long been a focus of attention in statistics (Lai and
Robbins 1979, 1985), computer science (Auer et al. 2002, Auer 2003), and economics (Segal 2003,
Kreps and Francetich 2014). There has also been recent interest in this topic in the operations
management community, especially in the field of dynamic pricing and revenue management. An
admittedly incomplete list of such papers is (Kleinberg and Leighton 2003, Carvalho and Puterman
2005, Araman and Caldentey 2009, Besbes and Zeevi 2009, 2011, Harrison et al. 2012, den Boer
and Zwart 2014, Keskin and Zeevi 2014, Johnson et al. 2015, Chen et al. 2015). We defer the reader
to the recent survey by den Boer (2015a) and references therein for a complete list and thorough
discussion.
Among these, the most related papers with our paper are (den Boer and Zwart 2014, Keskin
and Zeevi 2014). Keskin and Zeevi (2014) study the balance between learning and earning if the
expected demand is a linear function of the price while den Boer and Zwart (2014) consider a more
general case– when the expected demand is a generalized linear function of the price. These papers
propose novel variants of the greedy policy, namely controlled variance pricing (CVP) by den Boer
and Zwart (2014) and constrained iterative least squared (CILS) by Keskin and Zeevi (2014),
which enforce price dispersion within GILS and achieve asymptotically optimal regret. Keskin and
Zeevi (2014) also provide lower bounds for any pricing policy. Our work is closer to (Keskin and
Zeevi 2014), since similar to them, we study the situation where demand at a single incumbent
price is known to the firm with high accuracy. Our main contributions compared to these papers is
studying the problem in a data-rich environment (when demand covariates are available), showing
how this addition fundamentally changes behavior of GILS, and that it does not need any forced
price dispersion like in CVP and CILS. Similar to (Keskin and Zeevi 2014), we also show a lower
bound for performance of any pricing policy in presence of demand covariates. Hence we show that
GILS is asymptotically optimal.
This result is surprising since as shown by Lai and Robbins (1982), the parameter estimates
computed under an iterative least squared policy may not be consistent, and the resulting controls
4are sub-optimal. This fact is also shown by den Boer and Zwart (2014), Keskin and Zeevi (2014) in
the dynamic pricing problem (without demand covariates) and is termed incomplete learning which
motivated the novel policies CVP and CILS. Although, it is worth noting that a certain Bayesian
form of iterative least squared (when parameters to estimate have a probability distribution with
a prior) converges to the optimum values (Chen and Hu 1998).
Another related setting is dynamic pricing with demand uncertainty where the demand function
is not static and changes over time. Variants of this setting have been studied by den Boer (2015b),
Keskin and Zeevi (2013). Although, at a first look one can consider our demand function that
depends on price and covariates as a changing demand function, however our setting is a substan-
tially different problem. The reason is that the information provided by the demand covariates in
our model is hidden in demand shocks. In particular, if the covariate information is not available
to the firm, our setting can be exactly mapped to the case of static dynamic pricing where demand
shocks have higher variance.
In the learning and earning framework, beyond dynamic pricing, there are few papers that
consider how covariates may help the decision maker to improve the performance. This problem
was first studied in the statistics literature by Woodroofe (1979), Sarkar (1991) where a simple
one-armed bandits problem with a covariate was considered and they showed that a myopic policy
is asymptotically optimal. Much later, a machine learning paper by Langford and Zhang (2007)
considered a more general problem of learning and earning with covariates. Their problem was
inspired by online advertising where a platform such as Facebook, Google, MSN, or Yahoo needs to
match publishers to viewers in order to maximize the expected number of user clicks. They modeled
the problem as a K-armed bandits problem, with the contexts (covariates) which may predict the
revenue of each arm. This pioneered an active research area (contextual bandits). Examples of
papers studying contextual bandits are (Dudik et al. 2011, Chu et al. 2011, Seldin et al. 2011, Li
et al. 2014, Badanidiyuru et al. 2014, Goldenshluger and Zeevi 2007, 2011, 2013, Rigollet and Zeevi
2010, Perchet et al. 2013, Bastani and Bayati 2015). The main difference between these papers
and our paper is that in our model the reward is a quadratic function of the action (price) and
covaraites. But these papers either consider K-armed bandits or linear bandits where the reward
function is linear in covariates and the action. In addition, none of these contextual bandit papers
show optimality results for the greedy policy which is popular among practitioners. In fact, the
greedy-type policies studied by these paper, similar to CVP and CILS, have a degree of forced
experimentation where greedy policy is used in 1− fraction of the periods to maximize the reward
and the remaining  fraction of periods are dedicated to forced experimentation to improve learning.
The value of  is reduced over time to avoid a linear regret.
5Our results are also related to the recent growing literature in Operations Management that
studies benefits of combining statistical estimation with decision optimization (Liyanage and Shan-
thikumar 2005, Levi et al. 2015, Rudin and Vahn 2014, Bertsimas and Kallus 2015). The main
difference is that these papers focus on a static decision making task while here we are considering
a dynamic decision making problem. In particular, our focus is on the impact of combining statis-
tical estimation with price optimization on creating enough price dispersion (exploration) which is
required for the pricing policy.
While writing this paper, we became aware of a very recent paper by Cohen et al. (2016) that also
studies dynamic pricing with covariates. For the following reasons the two papers are fundamentally
different. Cohen et al. (2016) assume that demand is equal to 1 if price is less than a linear function
of the covariates which is interpreted as valuation of the customer. If the price is greater than the
valuation then demand is 0. But our demand function is quadratic in price and linear in covariates.
In addition, our demand function includes stochastic demand shocks. Due to the threshold form
of the demand function in (Cohen et al. 2016), estimating the problem parameters (coefficients of
the covariates) can no longer be solved by a simple procedure such as least squared. On the other
hand, their demand function is deterministic and does not contain demand shocks which are the
core reason behind the difficulty of demand estimation studied by us. Cohen et al. (2016) consider
adversarial covariates while our covariates are stochastic. Finally, we provide both upper bounds
and lower bounds for the regret of a popular algorithm in practice (GILS) while Cohen et al. (2016)
introduce new algorithms for their setting and prove only upper bounds for the regret. Another
paper at the intersection of dynamic pricing and contextual bandits is by Amin et al. (2014) which
considers a problem similar to Cohen et al. (2016) that is different from ours.
3. Problem Formulation
Consider a firm that sells one type of product over time. In each period, the firm can adjust price of
the product. Customer demand for the product is determined by the price and some other factors
(demand covariates), according to an underlying parametric demand function. The firm is initially
uncertain about the parameters of the demand function but can use historical data on charged
prices, realized demands, and observed values of the demand covariates to estimate the parameters.
This is the problem of dynamic pricing with demand covariates.
3.1. Model Setting
Our model builds on the model of Keskin and Zeevi (2014). We assume the firm sells the product
over a time horizon of T periods. The total periods T is a large number and is unknown to the
seller, which prevents the firm from using T as a decision factor. In each period t ∈ N, where N
is the set of positive integers, the seller observes some demand covariates of the market, that is a
6vector of covariates xt = (x1t, x2t, . . . , xmt) ∈ Rm sampled independently from a fixed distribution
px. We assume that px is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rm and
has compact support, i.e. there is xmax ∈R+ such that ‖xt‖∞ ≤ xmax for all t in N. Then the seller
must choose the price pt from a given feasible set [l, u]⊂R, where 0≤ l < u <∞. After that, the
seller observes the demand Dt in period t. We assume the demand follows a linear function of the
prices and covariates, which is commonly used in economic literature to illustrate the relationship
between demand and price. Hence, the demand function is formulated as
Dt = α+βpt + γ ·xt + εt for all t∈N (1)
where u · v denotes the inner product of vectors u and v, α ∈R is the basic market size, β ∈R is
the price coefficient (that is β < 0), and γ = (γ1, . . . , γm)
> ∈ Rm is a vector of coefficients for the
demand covariates. The parameters α,β, γ are assumed to be unknown to the seller. In addition,
{εt}t≥1 are unpredictable demand shocks, drawn independently identically from a distribution with
zero mean, finite variance denoted by σ2ε . Note that we assume there is a large enough inventory
that any amount of demand can be fulfilled by the firm.
Next, without loss of generality, we assume that Epx [x] = 0 since any possible non-zero expecta-
tion can be moved to the intercept term α. Additionally, we assume that the covariance matrix of
demand covariates (denoted by Σx) is positive definite. To make the math cleaner, we also assume
that each coordinate of γ is re-scaled so that the diagonal entries of Σx are all equal to 1 (i.e., all
coordinates of x have unit variance).
Remark 1. In Section B.1 we will show that our main result (upper bound on performance of
GILS with demand covariate) holds when the i.i.d. assumptions on sequences {ε}i≥1 and {xi}i≥1
are replaced by weaker assumptions that they are martingale differences with respect to the past.
We also assume that the seller has access to one more piece of prior information; through extensive
use of an incumbent price p0 in the past the seller knows the average demand at this incumbent
price with high accuracy. More precisely, denoting the average historical demand as D¯, the fact
that shocks and x have zero average help us to simplify the demand function because the expected
demand satisfies E[D] = α+ βp0. Therefore, with large number of uses of the incumbent price p0,
the average value is close to its expected value by the strong law of large numbers. Thus, we can
write D¯= α+βp0 which leads to the following modified demand function
Dt = D¯+β(pt− p0) + γ ·xt + εt for all t∈N .
We can treat D¯ as a given number a′. Hence, are final demand model is
Dt = a
′+β(pt− p0) + γ ·xt + εt for all t∈N , (2)
in which a′ is known, and (β,γ) are unknown parameters.
7Remark 2. Throughout the rest of the paper when we use the phrase “dynamic pricing prob-
lem” it is implicitly assumed that we are referring to the case where an incumbent price p0 is
available, or equivalently, to problem (2) with known a′.
To simplify the notation, we let
θ≡
(
β
γ
)
∈Rm+1
be the column vector of demand model parameters, and express the demand vector Dt =
(D1,D2, . . . ,Dt)
> in Rt in terms of θ as follows
Dt = a
′ ·1t +Ztθ+ et . (3)
Here et ≡ (ε1, ε2, . . . , εt)> ∈Rt, 1t ≡ (1, . . . ,1)> ∈Rt, and Zt is a t× (m+ 1) matrix with its ith row
equal to u>i where
ui =
(
pi− p0
xi
)
∈R(m+1) .
Without loss of generality, we assume that the prices include subtraction of production cost and
we do not write them explicitly in the formula. Thus, the terms profit and revenue are used
interchangeably. The seller’s expected single-period revenue function is
rθ(p,x)≡ p [a′+β(p− p0) + γ ·x] . (4)
Next we define p∗(θ,x) to be the price that maximizes the expected single-period revenue function
rθ(·,x) given the demand covariates x, i.e.
p∗(θ,x)≡ arg max
p∈[l,u]
[rθ(p,x)] . (5)
We assume that the true parameter θ is in the compact set
Θ≡
{(
β
γ
)
∈Rm+1
∣∣∣ −∞< bmin ≤ β ≤ bmax < 0 , and ‖γ‖ ≤ rmax <∞} ,
where ‖.‖ is the `2 norm. The condition on β just means that the expected demand is strictly
decreasing in price and we have an uncertain interval of negative numbers around it. We also
assume that the optimal price corresponding to any such true parameter θ and any vector of
demand covariates x is an interior point of the feasible set [l, u]. Similar assumption was made
by den Boer and Zwart (2014) and Keskin and Zeevi (2014). The reason for the assumption is to
avoid having the optimal price to be a corner solution of the interval [l, u] so we can use first order
conditions. In particular, the first-order condition for optimality would be
a′+ 2βp−βp0 + γ ·x= 0 , (6)
8from which we deduce that
p∗(θ,x) =
a′+ γ ·x
−2β +
p0
2
. (7)
For the incumbent price p0, we consider there is a small positive constant δ0 > 0, such that
a′
−bmax − p0 ≥ δ0 or p0−
a′
−bmin ≥ δ0 . (8)
This condition will guarantee that for any β˜ ∈ (bmin, bmax) the following inequality holds,∣∣∣∣ a′−2β˜ − p02
∣∣∣∣≥ δ0 .
3.2. Pricing Policies and Performance Metric
Let Ht−1 denote the observed demands, prices and the demand covariates before choosing a price
and realizing demand at period t. That is, Ht−1 ≡ (D1, . . . ,Dt−1, p1, . . . , pt−1,x1, . . . ,xt). We define
a pricing policy as a sequence of functions pi= (pi1, pi2, . . . ), where
pit :Ht−1→ [l, u]
for all t= 2,3, . . . , and pi1 is a deterministic function of x1. Now, we clarify the probability space for
the performance. Any pricing policy induces a family of probability measures on the sample space
of demand sequences (D1,D2, . . . ) as below. Given the parameter vector θ, the realized demand
covariates X1:T ≡ {x1,x2, . . . ,xT}, and a pricing policy pi, let Pε(·|X1:T ) be the probability measure
with respect to the randomness of demand shocks, i.e.
Pε(D1 ∈ dξ1, . . . ,DT ∈ dξT |X1:T ) =
T∏
t=1
Pεt(a
′+βpt + γ ·xt + εt ∈ dξt|X1:t) . (9)
Thus, pt = pit(Ht−1), which implies that pt is completely characterized by pi, θ, and Ht−1. Accord-
ingly the T -period expected revenue of the seller is
Rpiθ (T ;X1:T )≡Eε
[
T∑
t=1
rθ(pt,xt)
∣∣∣∣∣X1:T
]
, (10)
where Eε is the expectation operator with respect to the randomness in demand shocks. The
performance metric we will use throughout this study is the T -period regret, which is a random
variable depending on the realized demand covariates sequence X1:T , defined as
∆piθ (T ;X1:T )≡
T∑
t=1
r∗θ(xt)−Rpiθ (T ;X1:T ) for θ ∈Θ and T ∈N , (11)
9where r∗θ(xt) ≡ rθ
(
p∗(θ,xt),xt
)
is the optimal expected single-period revenue, given the demand
covariates xt. After algebraic manipulation of the above expression for the regret, we can write the
T -period regret as
∆piθ (T ;X1:T ) =−β
T∑
t=1
Eε
{
[pt− p∗(θ,xt)]2 |X1:t
}
. (12)
While deriving our lower bounds on best achievable performance, we will also make use of the
worst-case regret, which is
∆pi(T ;X1:T ) = sup
θ∈Θ
∆piθ (T ;X1:T ) for T ∈N . (13)
The regret of a policy can be interpreted as the expected revenue loss relative to a clairvoyant
policy that knows the true value of θ at the beginning; smaller values of regret are more desirable
for the seller.
3.3. Greedy Iterated Least Squares (GILS)
Given the history of demands, prices, and demand covariates through the end of period t, the least
squares estimator of θ is given by
θ̂t ≡ arg min
θ
[
t∑
s=1
‖Ds− (a′+βps + γ ·xs)‖22
]
, (14)
for θ= (β,γ>)>. Using the first-order optimality conditions of the least squares problem (14), the
estimator θ̂t can be expressed explicitly. In particular, the simplified demand function (3) gives us
θ̂t = (Z
>
t Zt)
−1Z>t (Dt− a′ ·1t) , (15)
and the deviation from the true parameter is
θ̂t− θ= (Z>t Zt)−1Z>t et . (16)
Because θ lies in the compact set Θ, the accuracy of the unconstrained least squares estimate θ̂t can
be improved by projecting it into the set Θ. We denote by ϑ the truncated estimate that satisfies
ϑt ≡ arg minϑ∈Θ{‖ϑ− θ̂t‖}, where by assumption the corresponding price vector p∗(ϑt−1,xt) is an
interior point of the feasible set [l, u]. We call the policy that charges price pt = p
∗(ϑt−1,xt) in
period t∈N the greedy iterated least squares (GILS) policy with demand covariates and denote it
by pig. Throughout the rest of the paper we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. We only consider the subclass of GILS policies where the initial m+ 1 prices
are selected so that the vectors [ps x
>
s ]
> for s∈ {1,2, . . . ,m+ 1} are linearly independent.
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Note that this is not a restricting assumption. In fact, if the m + 1 initial prices are selected
from any absolutely continuous distribution on interval [l, u] with respect to the Lebesgue measure
(e.g., uniform distribution) then given that the distribution of x is also absolutely continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rm, the matrix
Zm+1 =
 p1 x
>
1
...
...
pm+1 x
>
m+1

will be invertible with probability 1. We defer to (Billingsley 1979) for further details on this.
4. Analysis of the Regret
In this section we start by providing a lower bound for the cumulative regret of any policy for the
dynamic pricing problem with demand covariates. Then in Section 4.2 we prove an upper bound
for the greedy policy when the seller has access to demand covariates. Finally, in Section 4.3 we
will prove that in the case of dynamic pricing without demand covariates, the greedy policy can
still be optimal if the firm uses some demand covariates (even though the covariates provide no
information). While our proof of the upper bound which is the main technical contribution of this
paper does not require any additional assumption on distribution of the demand shocks beyond
having zero mean and finite variance, our proof of the lower bound which relies on proof of Keskin
and Zeevi (2014) for the lower bound of any policy requires demand shocks to have a Gaussian
distribution.
4.1. Lower Bound Analysis
If there is no demand shock in any period, then we can easily learn the true parameters by solving a
system of linear equations. However, these shocks have a high impact on learning and consequently
on the regret. We can statistically estimate the true parameters, but the estimation error will lead
to an inevitably growing revenue loss (regret) over time. Formally, we can prove that the regret of
any policy has a lower bound that grows with time.
Theorem 1 (Lower bound on regret). Assume that the demand shocks are i.i.d. with dis-
tribution N(0, σ2ε). There exists a finite positive constant c such that ∆
pi(T ;X1:T )≥ c log(T ) for any
pricing policy pi, any realized demand covariates X1:T , and time horizon T ≥ 3.
For any realized demand covariates X1:T , Theorem 1 gives us a lower bound on the worst-case
T -period regret of any given policy pi. Therefore, if a policy pi achieves a regret of order log(T ),
the same order as the lower bound, then we call the policy an asymptotically optimal policy.
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Remark 3. Authors of Besbes and Zeevi (2009, 2011), Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012),
Keskin and Zeevi (2014) also provide lower bounds for the regret in similar problems. However, in
their settings, firm has no access to the demand covariates. Theorem 1 is a non-trivial extension
since it shows that increasing the firm’s information, via adding the demand covariates that could
potentially expedite the learning, does not improve the lower bound.
4.2. Greedy Policy is Asymptotically Optimal
In this section we focus on proving an upper bound for GILS policy. First we introduce a new
notation. For a pricing policy pi, the expected regret over the uncertainty of demand covariates is
defined by
∆piθ (T )≡Ex [∆piθ (T ;X1:T )] . (17)
Next, we state the main result of Section 4.2. Its proof is provided in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 2 (GILS is asymptotically optimal). Consider the dynamic pricing problem with
demand covariates of Section 3 and assume that θ ∈Θ. The GILS policy pig achieves asymptotically
optimal expected regret. In particular, there is a constant C such that ∆pi
g
θ (T )≤C log(T ), for all T
large enough. In addition, the constant C is equal to
4|bmin|K0 σ2ε
λ20
[
p20
2
+
a′2 +mr2max x
2
max
b2max
+m
]
, (18)
where
K0 ≡ a
′2 + (r2max + b
2
min)λmax(Σx)
4b4max
and
λ0 ≡min
[
δ20
2
,
δ20b
2
max
r2max
,
λmin(Σx)
2
]
.
Theorem 2 shows that the incomplete learning problem of GILS is fixed under the disturbance
created by the demand covariates, justifying its popularity in practice.
Remark 4. Looking at the expression (18) for the constant C, we highlight that the constant C
stays finite even if rmax = 0 (or γ = 0) which is when the demand covariate carries no information.
This has an interesting implication that is studied in Section 4.3.
4.3. Astrology Reports Assist Greedy
One of the most interesting findings of this paper is that Theorem 2 can be applied to a special
case of the model when γ = 0, that is Di = a
′+β(pi− p0) + 0 ·xi + εi for i= 1,2, . . . , T .
Corollary 1. Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 2, the GILS policy pig achieves
asymptotically optimal expected regret, that is ∆pi
g
θ (T ) =O(log(T )), even when demand covariates
have no information (i.e., when γ = 0).
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In this situation, the demand covariates are not predictive of the demand. Thus, the optimal price
p∗(θ,xi) = a′/(−2β) is the same optimal price as in the case of not having any demand covariates.
However, the presence of the demand covariates in the estimation procedure fundamentally impacts
performance of GILS policy. Without the demand covariates, GILS policy has a regret which grows
linearly with the total periods. With the uninformative demand covariates, GILS policy achieves
the asymptotically optimal performance.
The above analysis demonstrates an interesting approach to the original dynamic pricing problem
– when there is no demand covariate in the demand function. The firm can keep using GILS policy
and add some potential demand covariates, as long as they contain random fluctuations, even if
they are completely uninformative. The key point is that the firm assumes the covariates could
possibly have a predictive power, and uses the covariates to predict the demand function. Then
over time, the greedy policy automatically screens out the useless covariates as their estimated
coefficients will converge to zero. However, since the coefficients are not exactly zero, the random
perturbations provided by them leads to a natural price experimentation which will rescue GILS
from incomplete learning. This is why we describe the scenario as “astrology reports” help greedy
achieve the asymptotic optimal performance.
5. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we provide three numerical illustrations of the GILS policy with demand covariates.
First, in Section 5.1 we demonstrate, on synthetic data, performance and dynamics of GILS with
demand covariates. Then in Section 5.2 we consider the case of dynamic pricing without covari-
ates and demonstrate the value of irrelevant covariates (i.e., the astrology reports setting) using
synthetic data. Finally, as a robustness check we look at performance of GILS on real data from
hotel bookings were the assumptions on distribution demand covariates fail.
5.1. Performance of GILS with demand covariates
We generate data by considering the following parameters: a′ = 0.6, β = −0.5, [bmin, bmax] =
[−0.55,−0.4], σε = 0.05, p0 = 1, and [l, u] = [0.75,2]. For the demand covariates, we assume there
are 10 relevant covariates (m= 10), and each of them is independently drawn from uniform distri-
bution on interval [−xmax, xmax] where xmax = 1.1447. The true coefficient of demand covariates is
taken to be γ = [0.01,0.01, · · · ,0.01]> ∈R10. This means the total variance of all demand covariates
would be ‖γ‖2 = 0.001. Finally, we set the bound of the parameter γ as rmax = 1. Recall that rmax
will be used in truncating θˆ’s.
We simulate GILS policy for T = 106 periods and record the results. Then we repeat the simu-
lation 50 times and present the average performance as well as its 95% confidence interval, shown
via a shaded region, for several metrics as described below. Figure 1 shows the re-scaled minimum
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Figure 1 Dynamics of t/λmin(t). Total periods T is 10
6, and the problem parameters are a′ = 0.6, β =−0.5,
p0 = 1, m = 10, γ = [0.01, · · · ,0.01]> ∈ R10, [l, u] = [0.75,2], [bmin, bmax] = [−0.55,−0.4], rmax = 1, σε =
0.05.
eigenvalue of the matrix Z>t Zt over the total horizon. If t refers to the t
th time period (1≤ t≤ T ),
the figure shows that t/λmin(t) is asymptotically bounded near a constant (100 here). This means
that λmin(t) grows linearly with time periods. Proving this fact rigorously is the main part of our
proofs for Theorems 2.
(a) ‖θ− θˆ(t)‖2 versus t.
(b) t · ‖θ− θˆ(t)‖2 versus t.
Figure 2 Estimation error. Total periods T is 106, and the problem parameters are a′ = 0.6, β =−0.5, p0 = 1,
m= 10, γ = [0.01, · · · ,0.01]> ∈R10, [l, u] = [0.75,2], [bmin, bmax] = [−0.55,−0.4], rmax = 0.3162, σε = 0.05.
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Figure 2 shows the estimation error of the parameter vector θ. The left plot shows that the error
converges to zero. We re-scaled the error by the time period parameter t in the right plot, and
t · ‖θ − θˆ(t)‖2 fluctuates but stays bounded which means that ‖θ − θˆ(t)‖2 converges to zero with
the rate constant
t
.
(a) Regret versus t.
(b) log(t)/regret(t) versus t.
Figure 3 Regret. Total periods T is 106, and the problem parameters are a′ = 0.6, β = −0.5, p0 = 1, m = 10,
γ = [0.01, · · · ,0.01]> ∈R10, [l, u] = [0.75,2], [bmin, bmax] = [−0.55,−0.4], rmax = 1, σε = 0.05.
Figure 3 shows dynamics of the accumulated regret over the periods. The left plot shows the
logarithmic growth of the regret. To see this better, re-scaling the regret to log(t)/Regret(t) in the
right plot, we see that the curve has a positive lower bounded which means the accumulated regret
has a growth of order log(t).
Figure 4 shows regret of GILS when the effect of demand covariates is varied. In particular, by
choosing the parameter γ ∈R10 from the set
{
[0.0001, · · · ,0.0001]>, [0.001, · · · ,0.001]>, [0.01, · · · ,0.01]>} ,
and keeping all the other parameters as before. We see that when the demand covariates have
higher predictive power (larger ‖γ‖) the performance is better.
5.2. Performance of GILS with astrology reports
In this section, we consider the dynamic pricing problem (with incumbent price) studied by Keskin
and Zeevi (2014) when there are no demand covariates. We will empirically show that “astrology
reports” (irrelevant demand covariates) fix the incomplete learning problem of GILS. We also
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Figure 4 Regret of GILS with varying ‖γ‖∞. Total period is T = 106, and the problem parameters are
a′ = 0.6, β =−0.5, p0 = 1, m= 10, [l, u] = [0.75,2], [bmin, bmax] = [−0.55,−0.4], rmax = 1 σε = 0.05.
simulate the base version of GILS (the one without covariates) for comparison. To avoid confusion,
we denote GILS with astrology report by GILS+.
We use the same parameters as in (Keskin and Zeevi 2014) that is a′ = 0.6, β = 0.5, p0 = 1,
[l, u] = [0.75,2], σε = 0.1, and the parameter κ of CILS is set to 0.1. We consider a single demand
covariate (astrology report variable), drawn randomly from the same uniform distribution as in
Section 5.1 and varying rmax ∈ {1,0.1,0.01}. Each algorithm is simulated 50 times up to time
T = 106 and average regret (across 50 simulations) is plotted versus time. The results are shown in
Figure 5. Note that in subfigures (a) and (b) we do not show 95% confidence regions to reduce the
clutter on the graphs since most algorithms have very comparable performance. Figures 5(a)-(b)
represent the same result with two different scaling of the y-axis. From Figure 5(a) it is clear that
GILS is the worst policy with a regret that grows linearly in time. After re-scaling the y-axis, in
Figure 5(b), we can see that GILS+ has a fundamentally different behavior than GILS, irrespective
of the order of rmax and it seem to marginally outperform CILS. However, in Figure 5(c), comparing
CILS and even the best GILS+ by depicting the 95% confidence region across the 50 simulations
we see that the observed difference is not statistically significant.
5.3. Results on Hotel Bookings Data
The objective of this section is to test robustness of our main result, demand covariates fix the
incomplete learning problem of GILS, by using real data from hotel bookings on Expedia (a large
online travel agency). Although we are not considering some important aspects of the real-life
dynamic pricing such as inventory constraints, our goal is to provide complementary simulations
16
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5 Regret: GILS+, GILS and CILS. Total period is T = 106, and the problem parameters are a′ =
0.6, β =−0.5, p0 = 1, γ = 0, σε = 0.1, [l, u] = [0.75,2], [bmin, bmax] = [−0.55,−0.4].
as in Section 5.1 where most parameters of the model are not synthetic and the distributional
assumptions on demand covariates may fail.
Our data is from Expedia, Inc. which is an American-based parent company to several global
online travel brands including Expedia.com, Hotels.com, Hotwire.com, Orbitz.com, and a several
more travel websites. The data contains user searches and booking records for 65,000 hotels during
November, 2012 to July, 2013. The data is publicly available1 and in addition to search and booking
records, contains demand covariates such as price competitiveness, hotel characteristics, location
1 https://www.kaggle.com/c/expedia-personalized-sort
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attractiveness, aggregated statistics on purchase history of users, etc. We limited ourselves to search
results that satisfied the following constraints:
• User looked for one room only for one or two adults (no children).
• The length of stay is one night.
• The price per night for the hotel is below $1000.
• The search occurred within 7 days of the booking date.
These conditions provide a more homogeneous data set by removing search results of strategic
customers, complications around multi-night discounts, special requirements for travelers with a
large family, or extremely expensive bookings, such that the final data matches better with our
dynamic pricing problem.
We also aggregate the search results and bookings for each (day, hotel) pair as follows. The total
number of booked rooms for each hotel on that day is taken as a proxy for the demand and the
average displayed price is taken as a proxy for the price. We also select several demand covariates
from the data. They are the Star rating of the hotel, the average Review score of the property,
whether the hotel is part of a major Brand chain, hotel’s Position on search results page, whether
the check-in day is a Weekend, a score for the desirability of a hotel’s Location and whether the
booking date is in Summer season. This led to our final data set with 267,832 rows of (day,hotel)
pairs. Table 1 demonstrates samples from the final data set with the demand covariates. However,
for our simulation we will standardize all covariates to have mean a 0 and and variance of 1.
Demand Covariates
Demand Price ($) Star Review Brand Position Weekend Location Summer
2 144 4 3.5 1 15 0 0.0058 1
2 95 3 4 1 29 0 0.0157 1
3 182.16 4 4.5 1 14 0 0.28724 0
3 68 2 4 0 16.3 1 0.0667 0
3 154 4 4 1 9.75 1 0.1249 1
0 146.3 3 4 0 15.25 0 0.0414 1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Table 1 Sample Rows of the Processed Hotel Bookings Data
The data also contains average historical price for all these hotels prior to November, 2012
($129.92) that we use as incumbent price. That is p0 = $129.92.
To obtain the true parameters of the demand model, known to a clairvoyant seller, we use a
linear regression on all 267,832 rows. The result is shown below.
Demand = 0.06361− 0.0001192 ·Price+ 0.007164 ·Star+ 0.00292 ·Review (19)
−0.0008887 ·Brand− 0.02568 ·Position+ 0.001736 ·Weekend
+0.01519 · Location+ 0.001228 ·Summer .
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where all coefficients are statistically significant with p values less than 3%. After estimating the
true parameters, in order to simulate a pricing policy, we will ignore the columns Demand and
Price and only focus on the (standardized) demand covariates. For each of the 50 simulation runs,
we randomly permute rows of the data and assume they are sequentially realized over time. Then
GILS will dynamically adjust the price according to the demand covariates, and estimates the
parameter vector θ. At each time period, we use the true parameters from Eq. (19) to calculate
the realized demand for the price (suggested by GILS). Similarly, we can calculate the optimal
price for that realization of demand covariates via the true parameters and hence can calculate the
regret of that time period.
Finally, we measure the accumulated regret up to time period T = 267,832 that all samples are
observed. We repeat the simulation 50 times (each time with a different random permutation of
the rows) to obtain the average and a 95% confidence region around the average for the t/λmin(t),
log(t)/Regret(t), and t‖θ− θˆt‖2. We note that since a random permutation of the same data set is
used each time, the 50 samples are not independent and hence the provided confidence regions are
not correct 95% intervals. We only plot them as a rough measure of statistical fluctuations. Other
parameters in the model are rmax = 1, bmin = −110 and bmax = −1−10. Note that these values are
selected very conservatively which leads to a very large range of parameters Θ. This choice is done
to demonstrate robustness of the results, but in practice one can use domain knowledge or prior
data to choose a smaller region.
Results are shown in Figure 6; (a) shows that t/λmin(t) has a constant upper bound, (b) illus-
trates that log(t)/Regret(t) is asymptotically strictly positive i.e., the regret grows by a constant
times log(t), and (c) shows that t‖θ− θˆt‖2 has a constant upper bound. All of these are in-sync
with simulation results of Section 5.1 as well as our theoretical results even though most of the
assumptions of the model are not satisfied. For example, the assumption on distribution of demand
covariates is not guaranteed or condition (8) does not hold. This demonstrates robustness of the
results.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
This paper considers a dynamic pricing problem when the demand function is unknown. The firm
leverages extra information – demand covariates – to determine the price in each period, in order
to maximize cumulative revenue over time. A popular approach in practice for this problem is
GILS that focuses only on mazimizing the revenue and ignores learning of the demand function.
But it has been shown theoretically and empirically that GILS has a suboptimal performance
when the demand function does not contain demand covariates. In this paper, we proved that
GILS is asymptotically optimal when there are demand covariates. This result holds even when the
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6 Performance of GILS on Expedia data. The total number of time periods is 267,832.
predictive power of the demand covariates becomes negligible. An interesting corollary of this result
is that, when the demand covariates have no predictive power, including them in GILS will fix the
incomplete learning problem of GILS and help it achieve the asymptotically optimal performance.
The results are shown to be robust using simulations on synthetic and real data sets, in particular
in situations where our modeling assumptions fail.
The phenomena that demand covariates assist GILS to achieve the asymptotic optimal perfor-
mance can be extended in several ways. First, while the linear demand model is well accepted in
the economics literature and revenue management practice, it is too simple and restrictive. There-
fore, extending the results to the cases with a more complex demand model with covariates is a
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promising future research direction. Examples would include generalized linear demand models, as
studied by den Boer and Zwart (2014), or models with more general dependence on demand covari-
ates. Second, this paper focuses on the simple case that firm only sells one type of products. We
expect generalizations to the cases with multiple products, as in (Keskin and Zeevi 2014, den Boer
2014), to be valid and plan to pursue them. Third, the interesting phenomena that disturbances
obtained from the demand covariates save the greedy policy from converging to a local (wrong)
optimal point, is an intriguing direction to study in other sequential decision making problems.
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Appendix A: Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
To obtain the lower bound on the regret, we build upon the result of Keskin and Zeevi (2014). Our
argument is by contradiction. Assume the contrary, that there is a realized sequence of demand covariates
X1:T and a special policy p˜i where for each t, p˜it : H˜t→ [l, u] with H˜t = (D1, . . . ,Dt−1, p1, . . . , pt−1,x1, . . . ,xt),
and p˜i is such that for any c > 0 there exist a Tc ≥ 3 with
∆p˜i(Tc;X1:Tc)< c log(Tc) . (20)
Now using the fact that ∆p˜i(T ;X1:T ) = supθ∈Θ ∆
p˜i
θ (T ;X1:T ), the inequality (20) would mean that for all θ ∈Θ,
∆p˜iθ (Tc;X1:Tc)< c log(Tc) . (21)
Now, we consider a very special case of θ, i.e., γ = 0, and the new parameter is θ∗ = (β,0). In this case, the
demand does not rely on demand covariates any more, that is,
Ds = a
′+βps + γ ·xs + εs = a′+βps + εs for all s= 1,2, . . .
Therefore, if we consider the dynamic pricing problem without demand covariates and with the unknown
parameter θ0 = β then the policy pi0 = p˜i, even though it may use the irrelevant information provided by the
covariates, is a feasible policy for this problem. Thus, we have the regret of the dynamic pricing problem
without demand covariates satisfying
∆pi0θ0 (Tc)< c log(Tc) ,
for any c > 0 and any θ0 ∈Θ0 where Θ0 is projection of Θ to its first coordinate (the coordinate corresponding
to the coefficient of price). This means we have
∆pi0(Tc) = sup
θ0∈Θ0
∆pi
0
θ0
(Tc)< c log(Tc) .
for any constant c > 0. But, the above statement contradicts Theorem 3 in (Keskin and Zeevi 2014), where
they show that there is a positive constant c1 such that for all feasible policies pi0 for the dynamic pricing
problem without demand covariates (γ = 0) and for all T ≥ 3,
∆pi0(T )≥ c1 log(T ) . (22)
This finishes our proof of Theorem 1.
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A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
First, we notice that ∆piθ (T ) can be written as below:
∆piθ (T ) =−β
T∑
t=1
ExEε
{
[pt− p∗(θ,xt)]2
}
. (23)
Here −∞< bmin ≤ β ≤ bmax < 0 is bounded, and recall that the expectations Ex and Eε are with respect to
the randomness of {xr}1≤r≤t and {εr}1≤r≤t respectively. In order to prove an upper bound on the regret, we
provide an upper bound on each term ExEε {[pt− p∗(θ,xt)]2} separately, and then sum them up. Also, for
simplicity, throughout this proof we will use a single expectation notation E to refer to both expectations.
We also fix the policy to be the greedy policy pig and assume the parameter θ is fixed.
Second, note that the revenue loss of the greedy policy is due to the least squares estimation errors. To
see this we note that the expected value of squared pricing error in period t is given by
E
{
[p∗(θ,xt)− pt]2
}
=E
{
[p∗(θ,xt)− p∗(ϑt−1,xt)]2
}
(24)
where ϑt is the truncated least squares estimate calculated at the end of period t. Further, denoting the
coordinates of ϑt by (β˜t, γ˜t), we can bound the expectation (only with respect to xt) of squared price deviation
by
E
{
[p∗(θ,xt)− p∗(ϑt−1,xt)]2
∣∣∣Ht−1 \ {xt}}=E{[a′+ γ>xt−2β − a′+ γ˜>t−1xt−2β˜t−1
]2 ∣∣∣Ht−1 \ {xt}}
≤
(
a′
−2β −
a′
−2β˜t−1
)2
+ ‖ξt−1‖2λmax(Σx) , (25)
where ξt−1 ≡ γ−2β − γ˜t−1−2β˜t−1 . Also, recall that Ht−1 \ {xt} = {D1, . . . ,Dt−1, p1, . . . , pt−1,x1, . . . ,xt−1} is the
history Ht−1 without the current demand covariates xt. Thus, β˜t−1 and γ˜t−1 are determined (measurable)
with respect to Ht−1 \ {xt}, while xt is a random variable with E[xt] = 0, E[x>t xt] = Σx. Next, we will find
upper bounds for the right hand side of Eq. (25). In particular, using(
a′
−2β −
a′
−2β˜t−1
)2
≤ a
′2
4b4max
(β− β˜t−1)2
and
‖ξt−1‖2 ≤ r
2
max(β− β˜t−1)2 + b2min‖γ− γ˜t−1‖2
4b4max
,
we have
E
{
[p∗(θ,xt)− p∗(ϑt−1,xt)]2
∣∣∣Ht−1 \ {xt}}≤K0‖θ−ϑt−1‖2 , (26)
where
K0 ≡ a
′2 + (r2max + b
2
min)λmax(Σx)
4b4max
.
Since θ ∈Θ, and ϑt−1 is projection of θ̂t−1 onto Θ, we have ‖θ− ϑt−1‖2 ≤ ‖θ− θ̂t−1‖2. Therefore, we will
try to find an upper bound for E[‖θ− θ̂t−1‖2]. To do this, we express the estimation error in terms of the
error vector et and Zt according to equation (16). In particular,
‖θ− θ̂t‖2 = e>t Zt(Z>t Zt)−2Z>t et
≤ e>t Zt
(
1
λmin(t)
)2
Z>t et
=
e>t ZtZ
>
t et
λ2min(t)
, (27)
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where λmin(t) is the minimum eigenvalue of the matrix Z
>
t Zt. The last inequality is a consequence of
Z>t Zt  λmin(t)I and (Z>t Zt)−1 
1
λmin(t)
I , (28)
where matrix inequality AB means A−B is positive semi-definite.
Since Zt = (u1, u2, . . . , ut)
> and ui =
(
pi− p0
xi
)
, we have
Z>t Zt =
t∑
i=1
uiu
>
i =
t∑
i=1
[
(pi− p0)2 (pi− p0)x>i
xi(pi− p0) xix>i
]
. (29)
Next, we will prove a lower bound for λmin(t) using the following variant of matrix Chernoff inequality for
adapted sequences from Tropp (2011).
Theorem 3 (Theorem 3.1 in (Tropp 2011)). Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space. Consider a finite
sequence {Xk}k≥1 of positive-semidefinite matrices with dimension d that is adapted to a filtration {Fk}k≥1,
i.e.
F0 ⊂F1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ F and ∀k, Xk is Fk measurable .
Now suppose that
λmax(Xk)≤R
almost surely. Then, for all µ> 0 and all ζ ∈ [0,1),
P
{
λmin
(∑
k
Xk
)
≤ (1− ζ)µ and λmin
(∑
k
E[Xk|Fk−1]
)
≥ µ
}
≤ d ·
[
e−ζ
(1− ζ)1−ζ
]µ/R
.
In order to apply Theorem 3 we need to define the filtration and the adapted sequence. Let F1 ≡ ∅ and,
for i≥ 1, let Fi be the sigma algebra generated by random variables D1, . . . ,Di−1, p1, . . . , pi−1,x1, . . . ,xi−1
and let Xi ≡ uiu>i . Then we have, for all i
E[uiu>i | Fi−1] =

(
a′
−2β˜i−1 −
p0
2
)2
+
γ˜>i−1Σxγ˜i−1
4β˜2
i−1
γ˜>i−1Σx
−2β˜i−1
Σxγ˜i−1
−2β˜i−1 Σx

=
δ2i−1 +q>i−1Σxqi−1 q>i−1Σx
Σxqi−1 Σx

where we introduced two new variables
δi−1 ≡
(
a′
−2β˜i−1
− p0
2
)
, qi−1 ≡ γ˜i−1−2β˜i−1
.
Next we state the following result on the minimum eigenvalue of E[uiu>i | Fi−1].
Lemma 1. We have λmin(E[uiu>i | Fi−1])≥ λ0 > 0 where
λ0 ≡min
[
δ20
2
,
δ20b
2
max
r2max
,
λmin(Σx)
2
]
.
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We will finish proof of Theorem 2 using Lemma 1 and prove the lemma afterwards.
Applying Lemma 1, we have that
λmin
(
t∑
i=1
E[uiu>i | Fi−1]
)
≥
t∑
i=1
λmin
(
E[uiu>i | Fi−1]
)
= λ0t , (30)
and we note that, the maximum eigenvalue of each matrix uiu
>
i is upper bounded by a constant R uniformly,
λmax(uiu
>
i ) ≤ Tr(uiu>i )
= ‖xi‖2 + (pi− p0)2 ≤mx2max +
(
a′+ γ˜>i−1xi
−2β˜i−1
− p0
2
)2
≤ mx2max +
p20
2
+
a′2 +mr2max x
2
max
b2max
≡R. (31)
Now, combining Eqs. (30) and (31) with the fact that each matrix uiu
>
i is positive semi-definite we can use
Theorem 3 with ζ = 1/2 and obtain
P
{
λmin(t)≤ λ0t
2
}
= P
{
λmin
(
t∑
i=1
uiu
>
i
)
≤ λ0t
2
and λmin
(
T∑
i=1
E[uiu>i | Fi−1]
)
≥ λ0t
}
≤ (m+ 1) · (2e)−λ0t2R . (32)
Now, we have enough tools to finalize proof of Theorem 2. First we recall from Eq. (26) that the expected
price deviation at time t is upper bounded by K0E [‖θ−ϑt‖2] and that ‖θ− ϑt‖2 ≤ ‖θ− θ̂t‖2. We also use
the fact that θ and ϑt belong to Θ to get the bound
‖θ−ϑt‖2 ≤ (bmax− bmin)2 + 4r2max .
Combining all of these we have,
E
[‖θ−ϑt‖2] = E[‖θ−ϑt‖2 · I(λmin(t)≥ λ0t/2)]+E[‖θ−ϑt‖2 · I(λmin(t)<λ0t/2)]
≤ E
[
‖θ− θ̂t‖2 · I(λmin(t)≥ λ0t/2)
]
+
[
(bmax− bmin)2 + 4r2max
]
P[λmin(t)<λ0t/2]
≤ E
[
e>t ZtZ
>
t et
λ2min(t)
· I(λmin(t)≥ λ0t/2)
]
+ (m+ 1)
[
(bmax− bmin)2 + 4r2max
]
(2e)−
λ0t
2R
≤ E[e
>
t ZtZ
>
t et]
(λ0t)2/4
+ (m+ 1)
[
(bmax− bmin)2 + 4r2max
]
(2e)−
λ0t
2R . (33)
Next, we notice that for any i≤ j, εj is independent of εi, xi and pi = p∗(ϑi−1,xi), thus εj is independent
of ui. With Z
>
t et =
∑t
i=1 uiεi and E[εi] = 0, we have
E[e>t ZtZ>t et] = E
[ ∑
1≤i,j≤t
εju
>
j uiεi
]
= E
[ ∑
1≤i<j≤t
εj(u
>
j uiεi) +
∑
1≤j<i≤t
(εju
>
j ui)εi +
∑
1≤i≤t
u>i uiε
2
i
]
= σ2ε E
[
t∑
i=1
u>i ui
]
= σ2ε E
[
t∑
i=1
(pi− p0)2 +
t∑
i=1
‖xi‖2
]
≤ tσ2ε
[
p20
2
+
a′2 +mr2max x
2
max
b2max
+m
]
. (34)
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Thus, we see that
E
{
[pt− p∗(θ,xt)]2
} ≤ K0E [‖θ−ϑt‖2]
= O
(
1
t
)
+O
(
[m+ 1][2e]−
λ0t
2R
)
=O
(
1
t
)
. (35)
Summing up both sides of Eq. (35), we get
∆pi
g
θ (T ) = −β
T∑
t=1
E
{
[pt− p∗(θ,xt)]2
}
=O
(
T∑
t=1
1
t
)
=O
(
log(T )
)
(36)
in which the summation
∑T
t=1
1
t
is upper bounded by the integral 1 +
∫ T
1
1
t
dt. This finishes the proof of
O
(
log(T )
)
upper bound on the regret. We can also see that the constant in O
(
log(T )
)
is at most
4|bmin|K0 σ2ε
λ20
[
p20
2
+
a′2 +mr2max x
2
max
b2max
+m
]
,
where we used the fact that diagonal entries of Σx are 1 which means its trace is m.
Lastly, we should also note that this constant stays finite even when γ = 0. The only dependence on γ
is through rmax which impacts the regret when ‖γ‖∞ becomes large. Thus, we have completed proof of
Theorem 2 and we only need to prove Lemma 1.
A.2.1. Proof of Lemma 1 Our proof strategy is to show that for any vector y ∈ Rm+1 the following
holds
y>E[uiu>i | Fi−1]y≥ λ0‖y‖2 . (37)
To simplify the notation we will drop sub-indices i, i− 1, and x. Next we write y = [y1 y>2 ]> where y1 ∈R
and y2 ∈Rm which gives
y>E[uu> | F ]y= δ2y21 + (q>Σq)y21 +y>2 Σy2 + 2(y>2 Σq)y1
= δ2y21 + (y1q+y2)
>Σ (y1q+y2)
≥ δ20y21 + ‖y1q+y2‖2λmin(Σ) . (38)
Combining (38) with the following inequality
‖y2‖2 ≤ (‖y1q+y2‖+ |y1|‖q‖)2 ≤ 2‖y1q+y2‖2 + r
2
max
2b2max
y21 ,
we obtain
y>E[uu> | F ]y≥ δ
2
0
2
y21 + min
[
δ20b
2
max
r2max
,
λmin(Σ)
2
](
2‖y1q+y2‖2 + r
2
max
2b2max
y21
)
≥ δ
2
0
2
y21 + min
[
δ20b
2
max
r2max
,
λmin(Σ)
2
]
‖y2‖2
≥min
[
δ20
2
,
δ20b
2
max
r2max
,
λmin(Σ)
2
]
‖y‖2
which finishes the proof.
Appendix B: Extensions
B.1. Extension to non-iid covariates and shocks
In this section we show that our assumptions on the demand covariates and demand shocks can be generalized.
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Demand shocks. The only assumptions required on the sequence {εi}i≥1 for our proof to go through are
that, for all i≥ 1,
1. εi is independent of Fi−1, pi, and xi.
2. E[εi] = 0.
3. There is a finite constant σε such that E[ε2i ]≤ σ2ε .
In particular, {εi}i≥1 does not need to be an iid sequence and can be for example a martingale difference
sequence with respect to {Fi}i≥0 and with finite conditional variance.
Demand covariates. Similarly, the only assumptions required on the sequence {xi}i≥1 for our proof to
go through are that, for all i≥ 1,
1. E[xi | Fi−1] = 0.
2. E[xix>i | Fi−1] = Σix where the sequence of covariance matrices {Σix}i≥1 are all positive definite with
minimum eigenvalues that are uniformly bounded (from below) away from 0 and maximum eigenvalues that
are uniformly bounded from above.
References
Arnoud V. den Boer and Bert Zwart. Simultaneously learning and optimizing using controlled variance
pricing. Management Science, 60(3):770–783, 2014.
N Bora Keskin and Assaf Zeevi. Dynamic pricing with an unknown demand model: Asymptotically optimal
semi-myopic policies. Operations Research, 62:1142–1167, 2014.
Joel A Tropp. User-friendly tail bounds for matrix martingales. Technical report, DTIC Document, 2011.
T L Lai and Herbert Robbins. Adaptive design and stochastic approximation. The annals of Statistics,
pages 1196–1221, 1979.
Tze Leung Lai and Herbert Robbins. Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules. Advances in applied
mathematics, 6(1):4–22, 1985.
Peter Auer, Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi, Yoav Freund, and Robert E Schapire. The nonstochastic multiarmed bandit
problem. SIAM Journal on Computing, 32(1):48–77, 2002.
Peter Auer. Using confidence bounds for exploitation-exploration trade-offs. The Journal of Machine Learn-
ing Research, 3:397–422, 2003.
Ilya Segal. Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand. The American economic review, 93(3):
509–529, 2003.
David M. Kreps and Alejandro Francetich. Choosing a good toolkit: An essay in behavioral economics.
Preprint, 2014.
Robert Kleinberg and Tom Leighton. The value of knowing a demand curve: Bounds on regret for online
posted-price auctions. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings. 44th Annual IEEE
Symposium on, pages 594–605. IEEE, 2003.
26
Alexandre X Carvalho and Martin L Puterman. Learning and pricing in an internet environment with
binomial demands. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, 3(4):320–336, 2005.
Victor F. Araman and Ren Caldentey. Dynamic pricing for nonperishable products with demand learning.
Operations Research, 57(5):1169–1188, 2009.
Omar Besbes and Assaf Zeevi. Dynamic pricing without knowing the demand function: Risk bounds and
near-optimal algorithms. Operations Research, 57(6):1407–1420, 2009.
Omar Besbes and Assaf Zeevi. On the minimax complexity of pricing in a changing environment. Operations
research, 59(1):66–79, 2011.
J Michael Harrison, N Bora Keskin, and Assaf Zeevi. Bayesian dynamic pricing policies: Learning and
earning under a binary prior distribution. Management Science, 58(3):570–586, 2012.
Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi, and He Wang. Online network revenue management using thompson
sampling. Available at SSRN, 2015.
Boxiao Chen, Xiuli Chao, and Cong Shi. Nonparametric algorithms for joint pricing and inventorycontrol
with lost-sales and censored demand, 2015. manuscript.
Arnoud V. den Boer. Dynamic pricing and learning: historical origins, current research, and new directions.
Surveys in operations research and management science, 20(1):1–18, 2015a.
TL Lai and Herbert Robbins. Iterated least squares in multiperiod control. Advances in Applied Mathematics,
3(1):50–73, 1982.
Kani Chen and Inchi Hu. On consistency of bayes estimates in a certainty equivalence adaptive system.
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 43(7):943–947, 1998.
Arnoud V. den Boer. Tracking the market: dynamic pricing and learning in a changing environment. European
journal of operational research, 247(3):914–927, 2015b.
N Bora Keskin and Assaf Zeevi. Chasing demand: Learning and earning in a changing environment. 2013.
Preprint, SSRN 2389750.
Michael Woodroofe. A one-armed bandit problem with a concomitant variable. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 74(368):799–806, 1979.
Jyotirmoy Sarkar. One-armed bandit problems with covariates. The Annals of Statistics, pages 1978–2002,
1991.
John Langford and Tong Zhang. The epoch-greedy algorithm for contextual multi-armed bandits. Advances
in neural information processing systems, 20:1096–1103, 2007.
Miroslav Dudik, Daniel Hsu, Satyen Kale, Nikos Karampatziakis, John Langford, Lev Reyzin, and Tong
Zhang. Efficient optimal learning for contextual bandits. arXiv preprint arXiv:1106.2369, 2011.
Wei Chu, Lihong Li, Lev Reyzin, and Robert E Schapire. Contextual bandits with linear payoff functions.
In International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, pages 208–214, 2011.
27
Yevgeny Seldin, Peter Auer, John S Shawe-taylor, Ronald Ortner, and Franc¸ois Laviolette. Pac-bayesian
analysis of contextual bandits. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 1683–
1691, 2011.
Lihong Li, Wei Chu, John Langford, and Robert Schapire. Contextual-bandit approach to personalized news
article recommendation, August 25 2014. US Patent App. 14/468,130.
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, John Langford, and Aleksandrs Slivkins. Resourceful contextual bandits. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1402.6779, 2014.
Alexander Goldenshluger and Assaf Zeevi. Performance limitations in bandit problems with side observations.
Technical report, Citeseer, 2007.
Alexander Goldenshluger and Assaf Zeevi. A note on performance limitations in bandit problems with side
information. Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 57(3):1707–1713, 2011.
Alexander Goldenshluger and Assaf Zeevi. A linear response bandit problem. Stochastic Systems, 3(1):
230–261, 2013.
Philippe Rigollet and Assaf Zeevi. Nonparametric bandits with covariates. arXiv preprint arXiv:1003.1630,
2010.
Vianney Perchet, Philippe Rigollet, et al. The multi-armed bandit problem with covariates. The Annals of
Statistics, 41(2):693–721, 2013.
Hamsa Bastani and Mohsen Bayati. Online decision-making with high-dimensional covariates. Preprint,
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2661896, 2015.
Liwan H. Liyanage and J.George Shanthikumar. A practical inventory control policy using operational
statistics. Oper. Res. Lett., 33(4):341–348, 2005.
Retsef Levi, Georgia Perakis, and Joline Uichanco. The data-driven newsvendor problem: New bounds and
insights. Operations Research, 63(6):1294–1306, 2015.
Cynthia Rudin and Gah-Yi Vahn. The big data newsvendor: Practical insights from machine learning.
Preprint, SSRN 2559116, 2014.
Dimitris Bertsimas and Nathan Kallus. From predictive to prescriptive analytics. Preprint, 2015.
Maxime C. Cohen, Ilan Lobel, and Renato Paes Leme. Feature-based dynamic pricing. Preprint, SSRN
2737045, 2016.
Kareem Amin, Afshin Rostamizadeh, and Umar Syed. Repeated contextual auctions with strategic buyers.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), pages 622–630. 2014.
P. Billingsley. Probability and measure. Wiley series in probability and mathematical statistics. Probability
and mathematical statistics. Wiley, 1979.
Josef Broder and Paat Rusmevichientong. Dynamic pricing under a general parametric choice model. Oper-
ations Research, 60(4):965–980, 2012.
28
Arnoud V. den Boer. Dynamic pricing with multiple products and partially specified demand distribution.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 39(3):863–888, 2014.
